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DICTA
THE PRESUMPTION OF DEATH AND
A SECOND MARRIAGE
JASON W. KELLAHIN*
It is well-settled that under the common law a second mar-
riage is invalid where one of the parties has a spouse living and
undivorced. 1 Such marriages have generally been treated as void
ab initio,2 and the rule applies equally to common law and cere-
monial marriages. 3 Generally this is true whether the second mar-
riage is meretricious or founded on mistake.4 No divorce is re-
quired to dissolve such invalid marriages. 5 All American jurisdic-
tions today make a bigamous marriage void, and under their
criminal statutes bigamy is a crime.
To give some relief from the harsh application of this rule,
particularly in bigamy prosecutions, the courts have frequently
applied the presumption that the prior marriage has been dis-
solved either by death or divorce, in order to hold the second mar-
riage valid.6 Generally this presumption is held to be stronger
than that favoring the continued existence of the first marriage. 7
In many states the presumption of validity of the second mar-
riage is strengthened by statute. Some such statutes permit a
remarriage when one of the spouses is generally believed to be
dead or is absent and unheard of for a period of years, usually
ranging from three to seven. Occasionally these statutes provide
for presumption of death, and declare the second marriage valid
until held void by a court of competent jurisdiction." Others merely
serve as a bar to a prosecution for bigamy. The Colorado statute
on bigamy 9 is of the latter type, providing, after a definition of
the crime:
Nothing herein contained shall extend to any person or persons
whose husband or wife shall have been continually absent from
such person or persons for the space of five years prior to the sec-
ond marriage, and he or she not knowing such husband or wife to
be living at that time.
Student, University of Denver College of Law.
'Riddlesden v. Wogan, Cro. Eliz. 858, 78 Eng. Rep. 1084 (1601) ; Pride v. Bath,
1 Salk 120, 91 Eng. Rep. 113 (1695).
2'Glass v. Glass, 114 Mass., 563 (1874); Pain v. Pain, 37 Mo. App. 110 (1889);
Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 52, 4 Am. Dec. 244 (1809) ; Thomas v. Thomas, 124
Pa. 646, 17 A. 182 (1889).
3Valdez v. Shaw, 100 Colo. 101, 66 P. 2d 325 (1937) ; Otte v. Pierce, 118 Colo. 123,
194 P. 2d 331 (1948): Greene v. Greene, 156 Fla. 408, 22 So. 2d 792 (1945); In re
Cline's Est., 128 Pa. Super. 309, 194 A. 222 (1937).
4 Bell v. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co., 240 Ala. 422, 199 So. 813 (1941) ; Cartwrlght
v. State, 64 Ga. App. 51, 12 S. E. 2d 370 (1940) ; Pain v. Pain, supra, note 2.
Riddlesden v. Wogan, Pride v. Bath, supra, note 1.
a Shreyer v. Shreyer, 113 Colo. 219, 155 P. 2d 990 (1945) ; Tyll v. Keller, 94 N. J.
Eq. 426, 120 A. 6 (1923) ; Smith v. Fuller, 138 Iowa 91, 115 N. W. 912 (1908) ; Lamp-
kin v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 11 Colo. App. 249, 52 P. 1040 (1898).
1 Shreyer v. Shreyer, Tyli v. Keller, supra, note 6; Smith v. Fuller, 138 Iowa 91,
108 N. W. (1906).
sRe Harrlngton, 140 Cal. 244, 73 P. 1000 (1903) ; Valleau v. Valleau, 6 Paige
(N. Y.) 207 (1836).
9COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 48, §201 (1935).
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Numerous cases have arisen where parties, in reliance on this
statutory presumption, or on the common law presumption of
death after seven years absence, have contracted a second marriage.
The words are frequently quoted from Glass v. Glass 10 that,
Though a man marry ever so often, he can have but one lawful
wife living. So long as she is living and the marriage bond remains
in full force, all his subsequent marriages, whether meretricious or
founded on mistake, and at the time supposed to be lawful, are
utterly null and void.
Nevertheless, the courts have not required direct proof that the
first spouse is deceased or has been divorced. Instead they have
treated the presumption of death or divorce as rebuttable. Failure
to rebut it has resulted in almost uniform decisions that the sec-
ond marriage was valid."
In the Colorado case of Shreyer v. Shreyer 12 the court said:
The presumption of the continuance of a previous marriage in
itself is not equal in probative force to the presumption of the valid-
ity of the subsequent marriage. It is presumed in favor of the subse-
quent marriage, that the previous marriage has been dissolved by
death, divorce, or annulment.
Such holdings are usually based upon the presumption that no
person will commit a crime.' 3
THE "ENOCH ARDEN" SITUATION
It is where the presumption has been successfully rebutted
that serious questions arise under the so-called "Enoch Arden"
situation, i.e., that after a subsequent marriage which is proper
under the presumption of death, the prior spouse is discovered to
be alive.
Even at common law, good faith in contracting the second
marriage has been held a defense to a criminal action for bigamy.
In Reg. v. Tolson 14 the wife reasonably believed her husband had
been lost on a ship bound for America. Before seven years had
elapsed, she married again, without benefit of a divorce. Unon
the first husband's return, she was charged with bigamy. With
an extended and valuable discussion of the doctrine of mens rea,
the court held that a bona fide belief, based on reasonable grounds,
in the death of the husband at the time of the second marriage
afforded a good defense to the indictment, and a lower court con-
viction was reversed.
Most courts, however, hold that intent is not an element of
the statutory crime of bigamy, 15 as it was under the English stat-
ute involved in Reg. v. Tolson. 6 To avoid the obvious injustice
1o Supra, note 2.
11 Inhabitants of Hiram v. Pierce, 45 Me. 367, 71 Am. Dec. 555 (1858) ; In re Dun-
can's Est., 190 S. C. 211, 2 S. E. 2d 388 (1939) ; Shreyer v. Shreyer, supra, note 6.
12Ibid.
I Lampkin v. Travelers' Ins. Co., supra, note 6.
14 23 Q.B.D. 168, 8 Eng. Rul. Cas. 16 (1889).
"5Rand v. State, 129 Ala. 119, 29 So. 844 (1901).
',Clark & Marshall, Crimes, (4th Ed.) §41, note 9.
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that might arise from this situation, most bigamy statutes today
contain provisions similar to that of the Colorado statute, barring
prosecution where the second marriage follows an absence of the
first spouse for a stated period of time.
17
But do such statutes validate the second marriage, where the
presumption of death has been rebutted? It has generally been
held they have no such effect. In Fenton v. Reed 18 the court ruled:
The statute concerning bigamy does not render the second mar-
riage legal, notwithstanding the former husband or wife may have been
absent above five years, and not heard of. It only declares that the
party who marries again, in consequence of such absence of the for-
met partner, shall be exempted from the operation of the statute,
and leaves the question on the validity of the second marriage just
where it found it.
Strict compliance with provisions of the statute is generally
required, and its protection is usually extended only to the inno-
cent party. A deserting husband who remarried while his first
wife continued to reside at the matrimonial domicile, the Colorado
Supreme Court held, was not entitled to the benefit of the statu-
tory exception.19
While exceptions to prosecution included in bigamy statutes
have not been construed to validate a second marriage, occasional
recourse has been had to other statutes to accomplish this purpose,
where justice seemed to require such result.
LEGITIMACY STATUTES AND ESTOPPEL
In the Missouri case of Phillips v. Wilson 20 a liberal interpre-
tation was given to a statute providing that, "the issue of all mar-
riages decreed null in law, or dissolved by divorce, shall be legi-
timate."
The husband had separated from his first wife, without a
divorce. He then told his second wife he was, "loose from that
woman and we can make an agreement which is a common law
marriage and it will be good." In reliance thereon, the second wife
lived with the husband until his death. The first wife also remar-
ried, making a statement under oath in her application for a
license, that she was single and free to marry. On the husband's
death she contested the second wife's right to administration of
his estate. The court said:
Although a marriage may be unlawful because either the man
or the woman has another spouse living at the time of the marriage,
from whom he or she was not divorced, still, if either one of them
married in good faith, believing that death or divorce had removed
all obstacle to their marriage, such marriage will be deemed void-
Supra, note 9.
"8 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 52, 4 Am. Dec. 244 (1809) : See also In Re 1(utter's Est., 139
N. Y. S. 693; 79 Misc. 74 (1913).
! Sehell v. People, 65 Colo. 116, 173 P. 1141 (1918). Cf. Magee v. People, 79 Colo.
328, 245 P. 708 (1926).
20298 Mo. 186, 250 S. XV. 408 (1923).
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able only, and not void, and the children of such a marriage are legi-
timate and may inherit, as legal heirs, the property of their parents.
No mention was made in the Phillips decision of the fact the
first wife had also remarried. The Mississippi court, however, in
the decision of Harper v. Fears,21 which has apparently been over-
ruled, relied on estoppel of the first wife to speak, in holding a
second marriage by the husband valid, under similar circumstances.
This case involved a dispute over the estate of the husband. The
language of the court is interesting in that it demonstrates a re-
luctance frequently shown in other decisions against flatly saying
a second marriage is absolutely void under all circumstances where
the presumption of dissolution of the first has been rebutted:
It seems to us, when the period of absence has existed for seven
years, the absent party not being heard from during that time, and
the presumption being that he is dead, and the wife having acted
upon such presumption in good faith and contracted another mar-
riage, such marriage is legal . . . if the law itself acts upon the pre-
sumption, we see no reason why a party acting upon it in good faith,
,by contracting an irrevocable status affecting the honor and legi-
timacy of other people, should not so act and such act be valid.
Why should the law permit a person to withdraw himself for a
long period, such as seven years, without communication to his family
and friends, and by such act cause another to remarry, and then by
returning to his original surroundings, bastardize innocent children?
Under the facts in the case at bar, the appellant was estopped to set
up her claim.
In Frank v. Frank 22 the majority of the court disclaimed that
they were overruling Harper v. Fears, and said that decision was
based on (1) the presumption of a divorce arising from the con-
traction of a second marriage, and (2) the estoppel of the wife
who had entered into a second marriage to challenge the validity
of the second marriage of her former husband. Two justices dis-
sented, one of them saying, "The statutory presumption of death
ought to be conclusive in such a case. In other words it ought to
be equivalent to a divorce." Both said the language of Harper v.
Fears was "too plain to be brushed away by interpretation."
In order to hold issue of a second marriage legitimate, the
Georgia court, in Eubanks v. Banks,2 3 placed its decision squarely
on an exception in a bigamy statute saying that under the common
law such a marriage was excused from the penalties of bigamy,
"and unless the marriage was dissolved by the judgment of law,
the marriage was treated as legal and the issue held to be legi-
timate." At most, the court added, "by common law, the second
marriage would have been held simply voidable," but cited no
authority to support this view.
21Harper v. Fears, 168 Miss. 505, 151 So. 745 (1934), apparently overruled by
Frank v. Frank, 193 Miss. 605, 10 So. 2d 839 (1942).
Ibid.
234 Ga. 407 (1866).
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In a later case,24 however, the Georgia court declined to pursue
this line of reasoning further. It held that where a wife remarried
in good faith after her first husband had been absent for seven
years, without knowing that the first husband was still alive, the
second marriage was void. The wife, furthermore, was not incom-
petent to testify against the second husband in a prosecution of
the second husband for murder. "The presumption of death of a
spouse, arising after an absence of seven years," the court said,
"must yield to proof of facts to the contrary."
COLORADO'S SITUATION AND REMEDIES THEREFOR
Colorado has apparently never held its bigamy statute to
validate a second marriage in reliance on the presumption of death
of or divorce from the first spouse. But in Davis v. People 25 it
was said that death of or divorce from the former spouse may
validate the subsequent marriage contracted in good faith.
An analogy could perhaps be drawn between the reasoning
applied in the Missouri case of Phillips v. Wilson and the Colo-
rado statutes on divorce and annulment which provide that neither
a decree of divorce or annulment shall affect the legitimacy of
any child born as the issue of such voided, void, or voidable mar-
riage.26 The provision for legitimatizing the issue of a marriage
which has been annulled was strictly construed, however, by the
Colorado Supreme Court. In Valdez v. Shaw 27 it was held that
the provision of the statute applied only to cases where an annul-
ment proceeding is brought. No element of good faith was involved
in this case, however. A different result might be reached were
that element present.
The Colorado court indulged in some interesting language in
Otte v. Pierce,28 indicating that the purported wife who had mar-
ried a second time without divorce has at least some right to rec-
ognition under this second marriage. In denying the equitable
relief of annulment to the husband on the grounds he had continued
to live with the wife some six months after he learned of the im-
pediment to her second marriage, the court added:
In case there should be further proceedings between the parties
for divorce or separate maintenance, it is pertinent here to observe
. . . that repeated references to the defendant in the trial court as
"Mrs. Otte," or "Florence Otte" or in any manner other than "Pierce,"
was unfair, improper, and probably prejudicial to her rights. Defend-
ant's name is now, and ever since August 2, 1939 (the date of the
second marriage to Pierce), has been "Pierce," and will so remain
until her marriage is annulled or dissolved by proper decree of the
court.
24Cartwright v. State, 64 Ga. Anp. 51, 12 S. E. 2d 370 (1940).
83 Colo. 295, 264 P. 658 (1928).
28 1935 COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 56, §38.
2100 Colo. 101, 66 P. 2d 325 (1937).
2Sl11 Colo. 123, 194 P. 2d 331 (1948).
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This would seem to indicate that the Colorado court sees some
necessity for divorce or annulment to invalidate the second mar-
riage where one of the parties has a living, undivorced spouse by
a prior marriage.
The general trend of the decisions today seems directed to-
ward holding the second marriage invalid in accordance with the
general common law rule, where only the parties to the marriage
are involved in the suit. But where the legitimacy of children is
involved, there is a strong tendency to find grounds for holding
the marriage valid, or at least only voidable, without too much
discussion of the common law rule, even in the absence of statute.
Logically, since the court is dealing with a problem of status in
most such cases, there seems no reason why the rule should not
be the same under either circumstance. No decision was found
where the court admitted there was such a difference in applica-
tion of the general rule. The same tendency applies to a lesser extent
where the attack is made on the second, disputed marriage after
the death of one of the parties to such marriage. There is an
especial tendency to support validity of marriages that have con-
tinued uninterrupted for a long period of years, and where the
rights of children to the estate of the deceased parent are involved.
Today the legitimacy of children of such marriages has been
pretty well cleared up by statute. There is also a strong trend
toward rendering these second marriages voidable only by stat-
ute. A California law is typical of these. It holds the second mar-
riage valid until its nullity has been adjudged by a competent
tribunal.29 Other statutes make a person whose spouse has not
been heard from for a specified time competent to marry.30 But
good faith in presuming the former spouse is dead or divorced
is generally held essential under statutes of this type, and again,
in absence of express provisions for validity, the second marriage
would probably be held voidable. A realistic approach is shown
by the New York statute which provides for dissolution of the
first marriage. 31 The subsequent marriage then is valid, even
though the former spouse should later be discovered to be alive.
Obviously the safest approach to the problem is to advise
divorce or annulment before a second marriage is undertaken, if
there is any doubt as to the death of the first spouse. But such
a course will seldom take care of those persons who, in a reason-
able belief their spouse is dead, remarry, only to have the first
spouse reappear. Typical of such situation is that where the hus-
band has been reported a war casualty. The dearth of cases in-
volving this question indicates that the parties settle the problem
amicably among themselves when "Enoch Arden" returns. These
"Re Harrington, 140 Cal. 244, 73 P. 1000 (1903).
3Rhea v. Rhenner, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 105. 7 L. Ed. 72 (1828) (Md. statute).
3 Thompson's Laws of New York (1939), Domestic Relations, §7a. C. Goset v.
Goset, 112 Ark. 47, 164 S. W. 759 (1914).
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amicable settlements arising out of World War II may yet come
back to harass the administrators of estates and cloud titles in
the years to come unless handled by resort to the courts.
In view of the present state of the law, the proper solution
probably would be legislation similar to that of California, hold-
ing such second marriages, contracted in good faith, valid until
declared invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction. Such legis-
lation should also include a bar to any collateral attack on the
second marriage, in order to preserve with some degree of cer-
tainty the rights of children or heirs of parties to such marriage.
JOHNSON V. SHRIVER: POWERS, USES AND
THE RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE
In Barnard v. Moore,' Mr. Justice Denison said, "We shall
assume, without deciding, that the rule in Shelley's Case is in
force in Colorado, i.e., if a freehold estate be limited to A, re-
mainder to his heirs, he takes a fee simple. .. ."
Johnson v. Shriver 2 comes very close to deciding that the Rule
in Shelley's Case is not in force in Colorado. The interests involved
were created by the following language: " . . . in trust for the
said Ada Conroe, for and during her natural life. . . . Upon the
death of the said Ada Conroe . . . then said property shall vest in
the heirs at law of said Ada Conroe .... .
This language falls squarely within the Rule in Shelley's Case
as that Rule was stated by Mr. Justice Denison. A freehold is
limited to Ada Conroe, remainder to her heirs. Yet it was held,
without referring to the Rule, that Ada Conroe did not take a fee
simple. Is this a repudiation of the Rule, or did the facts bring
this case within an exception to the Rule? This is a difficult ques-
tion.
Ada Conroe's interest was expressly limited to a life estate,
but that of course would not prevent the operation of the Rule-
in fact, it is one of the prerequisites that the ancestor be given
an estate less than a fee simple. Otherwise the interest limited
to his heirs would not be a remainder, but would be an executory
interest, and the Rule applies (except in the case of appointed
interests) only to remainders.
It might be proper to suggest parenthetically that the remark-
able persistence of the Rule seems not to be attributable so much
to a fondness for the feudal doctrine, or to an indifference to mani-
fested intention, as to its modern effectiveness as a means of clear-
ing titles.
'71 Colo. 401, 406, 207 P. 332, . . . (1922).
2- Colo. -, 216 P. 2d 653 (1950). It Is assumed that the reader of these com-
ments will have read the opinion itself; therefore, no statement of the case will be
made.
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